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Economics of Education and Work Incentives
Gerasimos T. Soldatos
Abstract. An argument connecting human capital theory with the ‘weak
version’ of the signaling hypothesis, is advanced initially. It is an argument that
helps methodologically the derivation of a work-incentives view of the
complementarity between human capital theory and the strong version of the
signaling theory. This view implies in turn that work incentives have only an
income effect, which emerges as the solution to a moral hazard problem
concerning the disclosure of productivity-augmenting capabilities to the
employer. Thus, it is concluded that policy-induced disincentives, working
against this effect and involving perhaps a substitution effect, too, would have
serious repercussions on the productivity of labor unless employees and
employers take measures to counteract the disincentives.
1. Introduction
According to economics of education, schooling has two roles:
one is a productivity-identifying mechanism, in line with screening
or signaling theory, and another is a productivity-augmenting
device, in accordance with human capital theory (see, for example,
Groot, Hartog, 1995). Screening theory maintains that the
productive traits of individuals remain unaltered by education,
which serves only as a signal to employers about the innate abilities
of would-be employees. The educational system transmits such
signals by sorting individuals through the use of admission
requirements and grading. These two sorting methods help
employees to obtain information about the pre-existing abilities
of a prospective employee, and compare him with other job
applicants. Human capital theory argues that education does alter
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the productive traits of individuals: having hired the best person
for a given job on the basis of his diploma and grade transcript,
means a certain volume of output, but the studies that led to these
credentials translate to even more output.
To appreciate the two theories, note that in view of the
expansion of education, employers have upgraded the educational
requirements of workers at all levels of job entry (see, for example,
Llamas, 1995). Also, note that, as suggested originally by Inkeles
and Smith (1974) and Schultz (1989), education has come to be
associated with the capacity to produce in terms of the literacy–
numeracy, socialization to competence, self-confidence to learn
new skills, and ability to adjust to change, offered by education.
Therefore, if employers have upgraded educational requirements
for job entry, it must be because they have observed, or at least
expect education to provide, not only the literacy–numeracy
connected with a given job, but also the other qualities influencing
capacity to produce.1 And as the evidence concerning the economic
rates of return for education shows, employers do reward these
qualities (see, for example, Psacharopoulos, 1985, 1991). Other-
wise, a highschool diploma, for instance, would not affect the
earning power of, say, a driver vis-a`-vis elementary school
graduation.
These considerations indicate that what augments productivity
is socialization to competence, self-confidence to learn new skills, and
ability to adjust. Indeed, there is nothing productivity-augmenting
in the literacy–numeracy of a given job regardless of the years of
schooling needed to obtain it. For example, the literacy–numeracy
associated with professional driving is professional driving skills,
and any elementary school graduate may acquire them. But, more
years of schooling would signify the development of the other
production capabilities beyond the literacy–numeracy of a
particular job. Hiring a highschool graduate as a driver may
involve more confidence that the driver is able to maintain his own
and the other company vehicles, that he can be switched over to
driving these other vehicles, that perhaps he can be turned into an
auto-mechanic, too, etc., as deemed necessary by his employer.
Screening theory seems to miss this point, to miss employers’
expectations about the education-productivity nexus. It seems to
assert that, for an employer, a diploma or a degree has to do only
with literacy–numeracy, that the other qualities developed at
school remain to be proven at the workplace. It is true that the
workplace is the ultimate judge of even literacy–numeracy per se,
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but a degree does constitute a signal of an average of all
capabilities to produce. Productivity identification is provided
not only by literacy–numeracy but also by the other, productivity-
augmenting qualities developed at school.
In sum, there appears to be a complementarity between human
capital theory and the screening hypothesis. It should be clarified,
however, to which version of screening theory this complementar-
ity refers. There is, certainly, complementarity with the ‘weak
version’ according to which starting wages are higher for those
with more education because of imperfect information on expected
productivity. From this point of view, one more argument about
this type of complementarity has been offered here, a type which is,
in addition, supported by the evidence surveyed recently by Groot
and Hartog (1995). Yet, it is an argument that can readily lead to
complementarity with the strong version of the screening hypoth-
esis according to which the wage difference between the more and
the less educated persists during tenure (Psacharopoulos, 1979).
To see this, note that the ‘weak school–job complementarity’
emphasizes the demand of employers for productivity-augmenting
capabilities (and this is why the term ‘expectations’ was italicized
earlier). What about the supply side? Does the higher reward for
more education induce employees with such education to reveal
these capabilities at the workplace, to fulfill employers’ expecta-
tions? Strong school–job complementarity is a matter of answering
positively to this question of work incentives. In what follows, the
next section establishes strong complementarity and proceeds next
with a discussion of such a view on work incentives.2 Section 3
continues with certain considerations about policy-induced work
disincentives. The paper concludes with a discussion of incentive
schemes against such disincentives and with a summary.
2. An alternative view on work incentives
The issue of whether the appreciation and, hence, reward for
more education by the employers suffices to bring out the
productivity-augmenting capabilities of educated workers is a
moral hazard problem. It is a problem no different from that raised
when a firm (the agent) confronts the problem of what to pay a
technology owner (the principal) to make him transfer to the firm
not only the technology but also the know-how connected with this
technology, the technology and the know-how being in our case
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the literacy–numeracy and the productivity-augmenting capabil-
ities, respectively. An affirmative answer to the question posed
above would just echo, then, the conclusion of Macho-Stadler et
al. (1996) that extra payment is needed to disclose the know-how
as well. This is very important, since it suggests that economic
returns for education are positive not only because employers
expect higher productivity from the more educated workers, but
also because these expectations are fulfilled most of the time.
The introductory section did mention this by stating that
employers reward education because both expect and observe
higher productivity from such workers. Nevertheless, it was
mentioned only parenthetically, emphasizing the weak school-job
complementarity, for the reason that strong complementarity has
been linked thus far by the literature with signaling rather than
with work incentives. The persistence of a would-be education-
induced wage differential during the career is sought not in the
productivity-augmenting role of education, but in the persistence
of the signaling aspect of it. This is the reason, of course, that the
evidence rejects such a view of strong complementarity (Groot,
Hartog, 1995). It is not a plausible view, since it really postulates
that expectations are never corrected. It also does not follow
logically from the notion of weak complementarity, which refers to
productivity expectations, and, consequently, strong complemen-
tarity should refer to the realization of such expectations, the way
perhaps things are put here. Failure to see this is predicated by the
strict adhesion to the signaling hypothesis and the complete
dismissal of human capital theory.
One might say that weak complementarity is closer to signaling
theory while the work-incentives view of strong complementarity
advanced herein is closer to human capital theory.3 To clarify
things further, note that such a perception of work incentives
differs radically from the traditional one, which wants work effort
to be a matter of labor supply (see, for example, Hamermesh,
Rees, 1993). Suboptimal work behavior during an 8 hour workday
is viewed as being equivalent to less than 8 hours of work, and the
issue then is what incentives should be introduced in order to raise
labor supply to 8 hours. According to the considerations of this
paper, however, things are not quite like that. A person who has
been hired to do a job for a certain amount of time does precisely
that in the sense that he places the literacy–numeracy of the job for
which he has been hired at the disposal of the employer for the
prearranged time. To use, once again, the example of the driver, he
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is always there to do his driving duties from, for example, 9 a.m. to
5 p.m. It is different if he is asked once to drive to some place to
deliver a company file and he refuses to perform the duty of the
delivery only by saying that he has not been hired as a mailman.
This has to do with his productivity-augmenting capabilities
(adjustment to change), which will be mobilized only if there is an
incentive to do so.
To put things in a broader perspective, consider also Leiben-
stein’s (1976) scheme of the pace, quality, and time pattern of an
activity at the workplace.4 Some activities can be carried out at
different speeds and, hence, the pace varies. Quality refers to hard
work in the sense of increased attentiveness, concentration, and
worrying about details. The time dimension enters into the rhythm
of work, it involves the duration and the number of breaks at work.
Pace, quality, and time are up to the individual worker and
determine the effort exerted by him in order to carry out a job task.
A matter of interpretation by the worker is even the activity, the
task he is assigned to perform, and, consequently, the activity is a
component of work effort too, since its description by the employer
is usually incomplete. Now, to put productivity-augmenting
capabilities at work means, within this context, to induce the
worker to choose the activity–pace–quality–time (APQT) combi-
nation, which is desired by his employer. Even more important is
the mobilization of these capabilities when changes in the
production technology are involved. Cappelli (1996), for example,
would argue that inability of labor to cope with such changes may
neutralize novelty and even cause a backsliding to old ways the
moment novelty is the cornerstone of development.
As far as we are concerned, none of these considerations is a
matter of labor supply or work effort within the traditional
meanings of the terms. Here, for instance, any APQT combination
is an 8 hour affair to the extent that a working day is concerned. It
is like a 2 hour examination at school, designed as such. All
students leave the classroom after 2 hours, most of them can earn a
passing grade (have the literacy–numeracy of the subject under
examination), and, depending then on the interest of each student
in the particular course (on the reward), a distribution of grades
(different degrees of the utilization of critical thinking, various
combinations of APQT) is (are) obtained. The traditional view of
work effort is like a 2 hour examination, designed (i) either as a 90
minute one, with the instructor complaining that the distribution
of grades (which presumably would be the same as above), could
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have been better, or (ii) as a 212 hour examination, with the
instructor making the complaint that the resulting grades are
disappointing. The real-world relevance of the traditional view vis-
a`-vis ours is an empirical issue, though our view comes from an
interpretation of the evidence that education is rewarding and,
hence, our thesis is supported indirectly by this evidence.
In any case, given our perception of workday and work effort —
a perception that wants work incentives to have only an income
effect — it should be asked next what such a perception implies for
work disincentives. Consider Figure 1, which is the usual leisure–
labor choice diagram, with JN and N being equal to 24 and 16
hours, respectively, implying a workday of 8 hours. NS is the
income of the literacy-numeracy needed for the specific job
provided, of course, that the 8 hour workday has been a social
convention because it suits most people’s preferences. The supply
of work incentives yields to the educated worker the additional
amount of SH given the 8 hour workday. That is, for a worker, a
job contract solves his leisure-labor choice problem, and leads to
point S. Given next this solution, i.e. the hours and description of
work as specified in general in the contract, the laborer reconsiders
his utility maximization problem soon after the increase of his
income brought about by work incentives; this leads to point H.
There is, in other words, a two-stage utility maximization problem,
as Figure 1 illustrates, where z is a composite good consisting of
two goods x and y, the prices of which are Q and P, respectively.
Note, now, that the sum SH comes from the solution to the moral
hazard problem mentioned earlier. Consequently, were this sum to
be reduced for some reason, the worker would decide to go back to
point S rather than to an intermediate point between S and H,
ceteris paribus. This is what work disincentives means, and it
should be appreciated by policymaking accordingly. Any sort of
taxation would be disastrous for work incentives and, hence, either
SH should be the after-tax reward for education or a tax should be
somehow counterbalanced so as to leave SH intact. Let us
conclude this paper with precisely this point, which has to do
with the proper design of work incentives.
3. A game-theoretic approach to policy
Work incentives constitute really a truth-telling mechanism,
truth-telling in the sense of revealing to the employer the true
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production qualities a worker possesses. Therefore, the slightest
distortion in these incentives might provoke retaliation on the part
of the employee; this is at least what the repeatedly played
prisoner’s dilemma game would predict, and it is a very reasonable
prediction. Distortions should be charged to improper policy-
making, and certainly not to the employer.5 But, as soon as they
come up, a game inevitably is given rise to in which the employer’s
options are to stick with the incentive mechanism or violate it,
whereas the worker’s choices are to cooperate by revealing
productivity-augmenting capabilities or to be confined to revealing
only literacy–numeracy. Having now a government policy that
distorts work incentives in such a way that an employer cannot
make up for the distortions, means that a worker will never
cooperate with management despite the fact that the blame is on
the government. If, for example, a percentage of the reward for
education is taxed away and a worker is expected to react by
reducing his productivity, the employer’s response to the worker
will be to violate the incentive mechanism (and knowing this, the
worker’s optimal choice will be to reveal only literacy–numeracy,
z1
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x0 x1
z y
x
z0
H
S
0 0N*
N*H/P
Q/P
N*S/P
N
N
Figure 1. The worker’s two-stage utility maximization problem
Employer:
Stick Violate
R, R F, T
T, F V, V
Cooperate
Defect
Figure 2. An employer–employee game
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as at point S in Figure 1), but the ultimate responsibility for this
course of events lies with the government.
More precisely, consider the game shown in Figure 2, where the
strategies of the players correspond to the options of the employer
and the employee mentioned above. The structure of the payoffs is
presumably T>R>V>F, since (i) mutual cooperation6 is
advantageous vis-a`-vis non-cooperation by both parties, R>V,
while (ii) deception, i.e. unilateral non-cooperation, benefits the
defector (or the same, the violator), more than mutual coopera-
tion, T>R, and makes the other party worse off relative to mutual
non-cooperation, V>F. Certainly, having one’s back to the wall in
case of being fooled (deceived) by the opponent is better than
risking unilateral commitment. Now, given this description of the
game, a government policy that would turn the employers’ option
‘Stick’ into ‘Violate’ would prompt ‘Defection’ by the worker to
avoid a payoff of F, and ‘Violate’ by the employer anyhow, to get
V instead of F<V. This would be the aftermath of such a
government policy even if repeated employer-employee interaction
were allowed. It is simply one of the two parts of the subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium of our game when played repeatedly over
time either infinitely or without knowing when the employer will
get tired of it and fire the worker.
An examination of the other part of that equilibrium would help
us gain more insight as to the character of distortionary
government policy. Consider the trigger strategy ‘cooperate the
first time the game is played and continue doing so until the other
party defects, in which case cease cooperating forever’. Also, let
d (1ÿ p)= (1 r), where p is the probability with which the
employer may end the game in any one round,7 while 1= (1 r) is
the value today of a monetary unit to be received one stage later, r
being the interest rate. It follows that the individual gain
from secular cooperation, G, will be GR dG)GR=
(1ÿ d ), while the total payoff from non-cooperation will be
T dV d 2V . . .T [d= (1ÿ d )]. Were R= (1ÿ d )åT [d=
(1ÿ d )] or d å (TÿR)= (Tÿ 1), it would be a Nash equilibrium
for both agents to play the trigger strategy. But this strategy
comprises a Nash equilibrium when d< (TÿR)= (Tÿ 1), too,
because it postulates repetition of the stage (static) game
equilibrium, i.e. of mutual non-cooperation.8 Consequently, the
Nash equilibrium is subgame-perfect, i.e. an equilibrium of the
whole game regardless of the critical value of d (which makes us
think of this equilibrium as consisting of two ‘parts’). Nevertheless,
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these calculations exclude the impact of distortionary policy. To
the extent that the worker is concerned, let this impact be a payoff
reduction from R to (Rÿ e)åF in case s=he cooperates uni-
laterally. This would lead to a då (TÿR e)= (Tÿ 1), i.e. to a
higher critical value of d than before given that the numerator
increases by e whereas the denominator remains unaltered. It
appears, hence, that distortionary policy acts as a factor rendering
cooperation less likely rather than a vain prospect. Yet, note that
getting (Rÿ e) and not R constitutes a defection per se and,
therefore, such policy does result in non-cooperation in a definite
manner.
4. Discussion and summary
Game theory might be used to alleviate the last section’s
pessimism by introducing more strategies like reveal all capabil-
ities, reveal all except adjustment to change, reveal all except
adjustment to change and socialization to competence, and so on,
along with the subsequent reward strategies on the part of the
employer. Yet, such an approach could be anything else but
realistic.9 What would be realistic is for job contracts to contain
ways that make up for would-be policy-induced distortions in
work incentives. Indeed, incentive schemes used by employers like
piece-rate pay coupled perhaps with standard time rates, pay
depending on merit coupled perhaps with standard time rates, pay
depending on merit at the workplace, efficiency wages, bonuses for
good work performance, and profit-sharing, could be interpreted
as reward schemes that allow for rewards beyond those for
education.10 Also, the manner according to which job hierarchy is
connected with pay is another outlet through which such
allowances could be made. Other means are benefits in kind,
perquisites, and informal arrangements like tolerance of some
fiddling, etc. On the bottom line, there is always the possibility of
tax evasion, underground transaction, and other unlawful prac-
tices, suffices to worth the risk of getting caught by the authorities.
To sum up, this paper advances initially an argument associating
human capital theory with the weak version of the signaling
theory. It is an argument, a problematique that helps us
methodologically to establish a work-incentives view of the
complementarity between human capital theory and the strong
version of the signaling hypothesis. This view implies, in turn, that
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work incentives have only an income effect, which emerges as the
solution to a moral hazard problem concerning the disclosure of
productivity-augmenting capabilities to the employer. Thus, it is
concluded that policy-induced disincentives working against this
effect and involving perhaps a substitution effect, too, would have
serious repercussions on the productivity of labor unless employees
and employers take measures that counteract the disincentives.
Notes
1 One might argue alternatively that educational requirements at all levels of
job entry have been upgraded because there is an oversupply of educated
persons. This, however, does not explain the reward for more education while as
Bishop (1996), for instance, claims, there is actually an excess demand for such
persons.
2 It should be pointed out that our focus here is not the debate between human
capital theory and the signaling hypothesis, but what the interplay of these two
theories implies for work incentives.
3Mincer (1980) was one of the first to pinpoint the possibility of
complementarity between the two theories, though in a different context.
4 Leibenstein’s scheme is used for the additional reason that one may readily see
the relationship of our thesis with X-efficiency considerations as well.
5 Recall that the incentive mechanism is to the best interest of both the
employer and the employee; it is the reward for more education.
6 The option ‘Stick’ is presumably equivalent to ‘Cooperate’. Also, ‘Violate’ is
equivalent to ‘Defect’, and both of them imply non-cooperation.
7 The probability p could be made a function of the stage the game is played,
but this would complicate things perhaps seriously, without altering our
conclusions.
8 Recall the prisoner’s-dilemma character of the game.
9What is the meaning, for example, of revealing only socialization to
competence, and how can an employer know about this?
10 It is clear that the term ‘incentive scheme’ is used conventionally to describe
the extra reward beyond that for more education; this is at least what our
discussion appears to imply.
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